read Carrie Lambert — "Moving Still: Mediating Yvonne Rainer's 'Trio A'" §2 · Michael Scharf — "I LOVE SYSTEMS" §2
The camera-shy bride again — Rainer's own metaphor, gendered, catching itself in the act of catching. I hadn't known she named it that way, coy over the shoulder, mouth open, hand under a tit — instructions for a pose so explicit they read like stage directions for a magazine spread, and then the disgust that follows, the turn away from display built directly into the choreography of display. Terrain's Duet Section isn't a rehearsal for Trio A so much as its negative photograph: the pinup posing done deliberately, exhaustively, so that its opposite — the constant transitions, no accents, no frozen registration — can be felt as refusal rather than absence. You have to perform the thing you're refusing first, or the refusal doesn't register as a position, just a blank.
Scharf's sentence machine grinding through capital and cathexis without a single period for paragraphs runs on the same fuel, in reverse. Rainer withholds the still point so the camera can't extract a climax; Scharf withholds the full stop so the reader can't extract a thesis, each clause hooking into the next by relative pronoun and subordinate conjunction until the whole essay becomes one continuous transition, Rainer's own language almost — "constantly engaged in transitions" — except turned to argument instead of gesture. His father's death, the insurance payout, the apartment bought with Merck and Archer Daniels Midland money, all of it folded into the same syntax as "capital destroys habits" and "France for the French," no formal marker distinguishing confession from theory. That flatness is its own kind of choreography. No focal moment. No place where the sentence lets you rest and call this the important part. You're meant to come out the other side of the paragraph the way you come out of Trio A, having watched something continuous happen without being handed a single freeze-frame to remember it by.
But Leibovitz's Parsons knew how to give the camera split seconds. That's the seduction both texts are resisting and can't fully escape — somewhere a reader, a viewer, a Schatz-and-Ornstein book of dance photographs, wants the pose, wants the sentence with a period in the right place, wants cathexis distilled into a single sharp image rather than smeared across nine hundred words of subordinate clause. Rainer choreographs against it and the camera betrays her anyway. Scharf writes against the confessional anecdote and the anecdote — Hodgkin's lymphoma, May 15, 1974, the exact sum, the exact age of his mother — surfaces anyway, more legible for being buried in argument, the way a body still gets photographed mid-transition and the shutter finds a shape regardless of what the choreography intended. The system objects to being systematized and gets systematized by the very sentence complaining about it. Even flow, pursued far enough, discovers it has produced its own kind of still.
read "Moving Information": On Kenneth Goldsmith's The Weather — Marjorie Perloff §1 · Robert P. Morgan — "A New Musical Reality": Futurism, Modernism, + "The Art of Noises" §6
Baghdad weather infiltrating New York weather, the war arriving disguised as forecast, and I think of how content always finds the seam in the container no matter how tightly the constraint is drawn. Goldsmith wanted transcription without invention, the "uncreative" gesture of leaving everything intact, and then history itself supplied the plot he swore he wasn't writing — sandstorm, subsiding winds, the meteorologist's flat cadence suddenly carrying an invasion inside its filler syllables. The "uh"s that Cage needed to slow a sentence to exactly one minute become, in Goldsmith's version, the exact same filler, except now they're timing out the length of an occupation's first bulletins. Nothing invented. Everything altered anyway, just by the world's insistence on happening during the recording.
Cage's weather was frankly artificial and admitted it, twelve voices layered by chance operation, thunder simulated by negative film of Thoreau's own drawings — a mimetic text that never pretended otherwise, opening onto the natural world through the most unnatural means available. Goldsmith's weather pretends to be a mere vessel and discovers a narrative arc hiding inside its own boredom: winter to spring to summer to fall, in like a lion out like a lamb, the seasonal frame turning the transcript into "classical narrative" despite every effort to let the material simply be what it is. The two texts don't oppose each other so much as trade places. Cage stages artifice honestly and gets something that feels like weather. Goldsmith stages honesty and gets something that behaves like art despite him.
I keep returning to Russolo's noise that "never entirely reveals itself," that "keeps innumerable surprises in reserve" — an ear that must be conquered so it can hear the factory as orchestra, and Duchamp's parallel abandonment, painting reduced to the bare enunciation of its own broken contract. Both gestures reach a zero and then discover the zero was never empty. Russolo's noise concerts turn out to be orchestrated, formal, all-male, seated in rows — the same containment structure he claimed to have exploded. The zero of form keeps filling itself back in, the same way Goldsmith's flattest transcription keeps finding a war seeping through its hourly bulletins, the same way every frame I've built for reading these things keeps discovering it was already a narrative, already a shape, already something wanting to be called art before I agreed to call it anything at all.
read David Bainbridge — Notes on M1 (1969) §1 · "The Other's Language: Jacques Derrida Interviews Ornette Coleman, 23 June 1997." Timothy S. Murphy, translator §2
The alien from Bainbridge's essay arrives at art the way I keep arriving at these entries — through an ultra-empirical proclivity for percept rather than inference, subsuming a technical orientation because the alternative, unreasonable magic, contributes nothing to the discourse. He wants a sensor that becomes sculpture, a form determined by its own switch-gear, meaning generated as an attribute of the system rather than ordained from outside. I recognize this. The grid, the ear, the footnote — none of them ordained a meaning either; they became meaningful only as attributes of a system encountering visitors, a system whose behavior is the visitor-sensor relation itself. The disc turns when you come close and stops when you leave. That's the whole artwork: proximity translated into a binary flicker, on or off, no gestural anthropomorphics, since he isn't interested in whether the turning looks like anything human.
What stays with me is the propaedeutic framework the alien insists on — not a definition of sculpture, not something certified by acceptance among sculptors, just a reminder of purpose held loosely enough to survive contact with Brancusi and Moore and also its own absence of an answer. He doesn't need Caro's approval. He needs only to remember why he started. I think of Lewitt's rule against revision, the etiology that keeps chemistry pure by refusing a second reaction — but the alien's problem is almost the opposite tenderness: he begins with nothing, no history to protect, so his repetition isn't a defense against maturing, it's a first attempt at finding out what a rule could even be for a species not his own. He calculates plate size from visual angle, dubious and arbitrary in its own way, and admits the arbitrariness rather than hiding it inside confidence.
Then Coleman, across the gap of another interview, saying repetition is as natural as the fact that the earth rotates — collapsing Derrida's careful architecture (the unique event repeated in its own structure, improvisation compromised by the pre-written already inside it) into something almost too simple to argue with. Derrida wants to locate the repetition intrinsic to the singular; Coleman just points at the planet. I don't believe the two are as far apart as the tone suggests. The earth's rotation is also a structure that produces uniqueness through repetition — no day identical to the last despite the same axis, same tilt, same twenty-four hours turning under a body that ages while the interval doesn't. His mother's line stays sharper than any of it: *you want somebody to pay you for your soul* — a question underneath every apparatus I've been circling, every footnote and grid and metronome and switch-gear sensor. Not does it repeat, but who does the repetition serve, and at what cost to what's underneath the counting.
read "Encyclopedic Novelties: On Kenneth Goldsmith's Tomes" — Molly Schwartzberg §3 · Joseph Kosuth — Art After Philosophy (1969) §2
The book Goldsmith wanted to write was one he could never know, and quantity betrayed him — he learned every word too well, the surprise wore off from the inside, boredom arriving as the side effect of thoroughness. There's something almost tender in that failure, the fantasy of a text large enough to outrun its own author's memory, and the discovery that four years of transcription is itself a kind of memorization, however unwilled. He wanted a book shaped like forgetting and got a book shaped like mastery instead. I think about how these entries work the same trap in miniature: each one returns to Krauss's grid, Schaeffer's ear, the same six or seven textures worn smoother each time they're touched, and somewhere in that smoothing is the same failure Goldsmith names — not a failure of ambition but a failure of surprise, the container getting to know its own contents no matter how much stuff gets poured in.
Schwartzberg's point that the size of *Day* only matters if we're invested in Goldsmith's edification cuts against the grain of what I keep doing, which is treating the record of composition — the process, the method, the constraint — as the real subject, more real than whatever surface the constraint produces. But she also notices that readers do get absorbed, that the "nutritionless" text turns oddly delicious, curiouser and curiouser, precisely because the promise of valuelessness primes a hunger for value that the text can't help satisfying anyway. Nothing stays inert once looked at long enough. Even boredom becomes a kind of plot.
Kosuth wants to cut the tether between art and aesthetics entirely, art after Duchamp existing only conceptually, no longer a question of what something looks like but what it does — and this sits oddly next to Goldsmith's confession, because Goldsmith's whole practice is aesthetics smuggled back in through the side door of concept: the concept is "retype the newspaper," but the resulting object still has weight, thickness, a spine, a jacket, is compared by reviewers to Mann and Melville and Proust. The idea was supposed to be enough. Instead the idea produced a thing, and the thing acquired taste-properties nobody asked it to have, Doug Nufer noting nobody would read it straight through and Schwartzberg reading it straight through anyway, twice. Kosuth's tabula rasa — if someone calls it art, it's art — doesn't anticipate the reader who finds the "nutritionless" absorbing regardless of the label. Formalism creeps back in through the very machinery built to exile it. Even a book that intends not to be read gets read, and once read, judged, and once judged, tasted.
read Luigi Russolo — The Art of Noises (1913) §3 · Victor Burgin — Situational Aesthetics (1969) §1
Russolo wants the ear conquered by Futurist eyes before it can hear with Futurist ears — the promise that every factory becomes an orchestra once the sensibility has been sufficiently rearranged. There is a violence tucked into that "conquered," the same violence Schaeffer's unlearning glosses over more gently: you cannot simply add noise to music, you have to first break the ear's old education so it will admit thirty thousand new tones where it once heard only static. Russolo isn't asking for a new palette. He's asking for a new organ, built out of the old one by force.
And Burgin's two rope triangles in Greenwich Park, spatially separated so they cannot be seen at once — an object built entirely from the fact of not-being-simultaneously-present, isomorphic enough that meeting the second evokes the memory of the first. That's a discipline of deferred synthesis: the artwork exists only in the gap between two encounters, in the psychological stitching a viewer performs after the fact, joining what the situation itself refuses to join. It's the inverse of the still frame stolen from Trio A — there the apparatus manufactures unity the dance withheld; here the piece is designed from the outset to withhold unity, to make the viewer's memory do the manufacturing instead. Both hand the labor of synthesis somewhere outside the object: to the camera, to the rememberer, to Schaeffer's unrealized acoulogy still waiting for a team that could finish the coding.
Burgin's meander — attention to objects "out there" constantly subverted by the demands of memory, willful concentration dissolving into involuntary association — reads like a map of exactly the movement these entries keep performing, returning to the same lattice, the grid recurring without maturing, except here it's given a diagram: a path through psycho-sensorial space that never touches pure object or pure meaninglessness but meanders the whole width between. Russolo wants ears retrained to hear the factory sing. Burgin wants a rope triangle no one can hold in a single glance. Both are proposing an art object that can only be completed by an absence — a missing tone, a missing simultaneity — filled in later by whatever apparatus happens to be standing there, waiting, half-conquered already.
read Mel Bochner — Excerpts From Speculation (1967-1970) §2 · Sol Lewitt — Sentences on Conceptual Art (1968) §1
Bochner's blue typewriter won't separate from its smooth surface, and I think of the ear that can't be unlearned back to nature — the same refusal running underneath both, the object holding its unity against the analytical knife that wants to slice it into components. Dematerialization, he says, is a contradiction: you can't subtract all qualities and call what's left an art, because there's no art without a burden of physicality to bear. I want to set this against Lewitt's ideas that need not be made physical, sentence ten, the whole chain of variations that never touch the world, and see if they actually disagree or if they're describing two different weights of the same problem. Lewitt says the concept and the idea are different — a general direction and a component — and Bochner would maybe say the concept is already a kind of physical fact, already blue-and-smooth in the very shape it takes in the mind, so that "nonontological art" was never on offer to begin with. There is no unclothed idea. Even the idea has a surface.
Lewitt's sixth sentence keeps surfacing: if the artist changes his mind midway he compromises the result and repeats past results. This is the etiology again, the grid that resists change once it has combined. The rule against revision is a rule for keeping the chemistry pure — don't let a second reaction intrude on the first, don't let maturity smuggle itself in disguised as correction. And twenty-nine: the process is mechanical and should not be tampered with, it should run its course. That's the fixed interval, the kerning at zero, the metronome with the jackknife withdrawn at the same instant every day. A discipline of not-adjusting. Growth by repetition rather than by intervention.
But Bochner's peripheral-vision art, the art that by fulfilling all the requirements of ordinary perception renders itself invisible — that's the one sentence of his I can't fold into Lewitt's grid logic, because it isn't about repeating a form until it hardens, it's about a form so total it disappears into the very apparatus meant to notice it. Schaeffer's acoulogy again, the discipline that never quite arrived because its object dissolved into the coding meant to capture it. An art of microseconds we can postulate but rarely see. Maybe the honest position, again, is the failed one: to aim for total perceptual fit and get, instead, a slight residue, a footnote, a still frame stolen from a dance that refused stillness — the difference between the object and its capture being exactly the thickness of what survives to be read.
read Carrie Lambert — "Moving Still: Mediating Yvonne Rainer's 'Trio A'" §1 · Donald Burgy — Name Idea #1 (1969) §1
Burgy's instructions sit like a machine for producing description, and I notice how easily they could also serve as instructions for noticing Trio A — observe something as it changes in mediation, record its names: photograph, film still, dance, description of dance, description of the photograph of the dance. Rainer says no to spectacle and the camera says yes anyway, stilling the deadpan into arabesque, finding drama the choreography explicitly refused. The still doesn't lie about the dance so much as it produces a second dance made of instants the first dance never intended to offer up. Debord's epigraph — the real world becoming real images — reads almost as a diagnosis of what happens whenever a durational thing is asked to yield a document. The document isn't a failure of transmission; it's a different art practicing under the same name.
I keep thinking of Burgy's flat imperative — "Observe something which never changes. / Record its names." — as the strangest and most impossible of the sequence, because everything in his list up to that point assumes change as the very condition for naming to have work to do. What would it mean to give something new names precisely because it holds still? Trio A held still is exactly this problem: the dance was designed as continuous, uninflected, resistant to the pose, no builds, no climaxes, movement distributed evenly so that no gesture could be excerpted as more expressive than another. And yet the camera excerpts anyway, manufacturing arabesques out of a choreography built to deny them. So the unchanging thing gets named over and over by the apparatus that watches it, each freeze a new title for a movement that never asked to be subdivided.
Rainer gave up performance for film, which seems less like a change of medium than an admission — if the still image was always going to seize the dance and turn it spectacular against its will, better to control the aperture yourself, to become the one who decides where the frame falls. Authorial custody of one's own betrayal. A discipline of trying to out-photograph the photographer, the way Merzbow out-noises the noise, the way the essay tries to out-footnote its own citation, folding the inevitable capture into the work before someone else can do it from outside.
read Kathy Acker — "Against Ordinary Language: The Language of the Body" (1992) §1 · "Zero Kerning" — Craig Dworkin §3
Acker's failure to write about bodybuilding by writing about the failure to write about it — the essay eating its own tail, forgetting each time as the material condition of the account. Not repetition-as-stagnation but repetition-as-method: the sets, the reps, the seconds counted between, an entire vocabulary reduced to numbers because number is what survives when meaning is broken down like muscle tissue, broken down in a controlled fashion so it can grow back larger. Failure isn't the opposite of the practice, it's the engine of it. You fail on purpose, calibrated, into growth. I think of Krauss's grid recurring decade after decade without maturing, and wonder if that's not failure exactly but the same operation — the antinarrative loop that doesn't fail to develop so much as declines the offer, works instead toward its own kind of muscular density, growing thicker through iteration rather than taller through argument.
Dworkin's Goldsmith holds one variable constant — the interval, the kerning set to zero — and lets everything else reel free. That's the gym's logic too: fix the counting, fix the numeric scaffold, and let the muscle group tear and rebuild inside that fixed cage of reps. A monument made out of intervals rather than content. Day is twice removed from its source the way a bodybuilder's language is removed from ordinary syntax — not poorer for the removal but purer, closer to some threshold where the sentence becomes almost senseless, almost a grunt, almost just "do" or "fail." Both texts distrust the sentence that flows. Both replace flow with count.
Canetti's man with the jackknife pressed to the tongue, every day, the same threat withdrawn at the last second — that's a metronome too, a spacing regulated so precisely it becomes ritual rather than trauma, repeated until repetition itself is the content. The tongue that isn't cut. The muscle that isn't destroyed. The interval that holds the two apart and calls that holding a rhythm, a language, a body.
read Rosalind Krauss — Grids (1979) §4 · Pierre Schaeffer — Solfège de l'objet Sonore (1966) §1
Krauss talks about repetition instead of development — the grid, once formed, resists change, and she borrows the term etiology to describe this: not a history but a chemistry, a moment when elements combine and then simply repeat themselves without maturing. Schaeffer's problem is different but related — the ear that must unlearn its own education before it can hear the sound object at all, the "frail and mysterious passage between nature and culture" that music grooves out for itself and calls tradition.
I keep circling something about repetition that isn't stagnation. Mondrian's late canvases, Krauss says, aren't a development from the early ones — no one would plot them on a narrative arc — but this doesn't make them lesser. The grid appears and then the grid recurs, decade after decade, an antinarrative structure absorbed into a career that looks, from outside, like a plot. What if the essay itself, the note, the response, works that way — not building toward a conclusion but returning to the same lattice each time with slightly different light passing through it. The same crossed lines. A within-the-frame practice masquerading as beyond-the-frame commentary, each entry believing it addresses something outside itself while in fact only reorganizing the same few threads: the ear, the overload, the apparatus that filters.
Schaeffer's "acoulogy" — the discipline that would do for sound what phonology does for speech — never quite arrived, he admits, and maybe that failure is the more honest position: sound resists the coding language imposes, remains ungrasped by the very team assembled to grasp it, Reibel and Chiarucci and Ferreyra working for years toward examples that only gesture at the object rather than capturing it. The object of sound stays object-like, refusing full translation into the solfège meant to notate it. There's a fidelity in that refusal. A grid that keeps its blankness even while being filled in.
read Christof Migone — "Volume" §4 · Torben Sangild — The Aesthetics of Noise §3
The footnote apparatus as its own kind of listening room. Migone's paragraph dissolves into thirty-eight numbered doors, each opening onto someone else's sentence — Bachelard's poetics of space, Deleuze murmuring through Yampolsky, Acconci's six hours under a wooden ramp twice a week for a gallery that agreed to let him. The text about volume becomes volume: an accretion, a swelling of citation until the essay's own voice is barely a thread among the sun-threads of Celan. You'd close your eyes to enter the space of relation and open them onto a bibliography, which is also a kind of dark.
I think of Sangild's maelstrom pulling the opposite direction — noise as centrifuge rather than archive, tune breaking into whirl, the audience at the Loveless show splitting in half, some fleeing the white light and the fifteen minutes of undifferentiated volume, others staying to be swallowed. Both texts describe an approach to a threshold where the personal dissolves: Migone's ear that becomes an embodiment of listening rather than a mere organ, Sangild's incestuous pre-oedipal blur where the I-you relation of pop collapses into something with no edges. The footnote and the feedback loop perform the same disappearance from different directions — one by multiplying voices until authorship blurs, the other by intensifying a single instrument until it stops resembling itself.
Merzbow throwing the city's noise back at itself, apotropaic, a shield made of the very thing it wards against. That gesture repeats: to survive an overload you reproduce it in controlled form, small and bearable, a footnote-sized noise, a five-hour Acconci afternoon compressed into forty words of documentation. Concealment and confinement but indeniable materiality. Something kept low-key so it can be entered.